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Abstract
Educational resources distributed via the Internet are rapidly proliferating. One prominent
concern associated with these potentially transformative developments is that, as many of the
leading technologies of the last several decades have been, these new sweeping technological
changes will be highly disequalizing, creating superstar teachers, a wider gulf between di¤erent
groups of students and potentially a winner-take-all educational system. In this paper, we
argue that, these important concerns notwithstanding, a major impact of the superstars created
by web-based educational technologies will be the democratization of education: not only will
educational resources be more equally distributed, but also lower-skilled teachers will be winners
from this technology. At the root of our results is the observation that for web-based technologies
to exploit the comparative advantage of skilled lecturers, they will need to be complemented with
opportunities for face-to-face discussions with instructors, and web-based lectures will increase
the quantity and quality of teaching services complementary to such instruction, potentially
increasing the marginal product and wages of lower-skill teachers.
Keywords: computers, education, inequality, Internet, non-rival technologies, online edu-
cation, superstars.
JEL Classication: I20, I24, A20, O33.
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1 Introduction
Educational resources distributed via the Internet are rapidly proliferating. These new resources
include lecture videos, on-line teaching notes, Internet chat groups, on-line interactive problem sets
with instantaneous feedback/grading, educational games, and many other developing technologies.
Numerous institutions have created fully autonomous software that grades student essays.1 In the
popular press, MOOCs (massive open on-line courses) have received the most fanfare, though the
social value of these courses is as yet unproven and the high drop-out rates (in excess of 90%) have
been fodder for much debate.2
One technology that promises to be particularly scalable is lecture videos and other online
teaching tools that make the skills of some of the most e¤ective teachers more widely available to
students around the world  thus almost non-rivalrous. One prominent concern, however, is
that as many of the leading technologies of the last several decades have been, these new sweeping
technological changes will be disequalizing, creating winner-take-all superstar teachers, as well as
a wider gulf between di¤erent groups of students.3
In this paper, we argue that, these important concerns notwithstanding, a major impact of the
superstars created by web-based educational technologies will be the democratization of education:
not only will educational resources be more equally distributed, but also lower-skilled teachers will
be winners from this technology.
At the root of our results are two observations. First, in the status quo there is considerable
inequality in the distribution of educational resources both within countries and especially between
countries. Second, for web-based technologies to exploit the comparative advantage of skilled lectur-
ers, these technologies will need to be complemented with opportunities for face-to-face discussions
with instructors.
In the model we use to formalize these ideas, new human capital is generated using the existing
human capital of students (arising from prior education or as family endowment) and various com-
1One leader is the edX consortium, which has produced EASE (Enhanced AI Scoring Engine), a library that
allows for machine learning based classication of textual content. See https://readthedocs.org/projects/ease/.
2See Perna et al. (2013) for some empirical facts on the rst seventeen UPenn MOOCs o¤ered; Bannerjee and
Duo (2014) provide empirical evidence of certain factors that inuence the success of MOOCs.
3On superstar phenomena, see Rosen (1981); on the e¤ect of technology on inequality over the last century, see
Goldin and Katz (2008); on the e¤ects of the recent wave of computerized and automated technologies on the wage
and employment structure, see Acemoglu and Autor (2011); and on the rise of winner-take-all society more generally
due to technological, sociological and institutional reasons, see Frank and Cook (1996).
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plementary teaching activities (e.g., lecturing, grading, class discussions, one-on-one conversations
and so on). Web-based technologies enable teachers to generate non-rival educational services that
can be used as inputs in multiple countries/classrooms simultaneously (e.g., an Internet lecture that
can be watched simultaneously in Beijing and Baltimore), but these still need to be complemented
with one-on-one instruction provided by local teachers.
The ability to create non-rival educational services via the web creates four interrelated conse-
quences.
The rst is a two-part technological windfallfor students: (i) they now have access to lectures
of the best (superstar) global teachers rather than having to rely entirely on lectures from local
teachers; and (ii) the teacher resources freed from lecturing can be reallocated to other, comple-
mentary teaching activities. Both of these e¤ects raise the educational attainment of all students
in all countries (except the leader country).
The second is a democratizing e¤ect reducing inequality of human capital among students.
This is because the gains in educational attainment are disproportionately concentrated at the
bottom of the educational attainment gradient.
The third is the expected negative crowd-out e¤ect on non-superstar teachers, who will be
dislocated from their lecturing tasks. They will instead focus on teaching activities that are not
web-based, and due to diminishing returns in these tasks, their marginal product and thus wages
will be depressed.
Interestingly, however, the fourth consequence is a complementarity e¤ect, o¤setting the
third e¤ect and creating a potentially net positive e¤ect on the salaries of non-superstar teach-
ers. Web-based technologies raise the quantity and quality of web-based educational inputs that
are complementary for local teachers, thereby raising these local teachersmarginal product and
earnings.
A priori either the third or fourth e¤ect could dominate. We show that the positive complemen-
tarity e¤ect dominates for teachers with su¢ ciently low levels of human capital, while the crowd-out
e¤ect dominates for teachers with su¢ ciently high (but non-superstar) levels of human capital. In
particular, initially, teachers below a critical threshold see their earnings increase.
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2 Model
To aid exposition, we refer to two human capital production regimes: the pre- and post-Internet
regimes.
2.1 Pre-Internet allocation
The world consists of N islands (e.g., countries), each inhabited by a continuum s > 0 of students
and a continuum 1 of teachers. Without loss of generality we normalize s = 1.
We study the impact of technology in enabling cross-island application of teachersknowledge
and skills. We assume that the human capital of all students before they enter formal schooling is
the same within an island, and in country j we denote it by ej (for endowment). We also assume
that the human capital of all teachers within an island is the same, given by hj on island j. All
teachers in the world have one unit of time.
The post-schooling human capital of students on island j, which we refer to as educational
attainment, is also equal to their labor earnings, and is given by
yj = e
1 
j X

j ; (1)
where  2 (0; 1) and Xj is an aggregator of the teaching services supplied on island j. Specically,
we assume a Cobb-Douglas (unit elasticity) aggregator of the form
lnXj =
Z 1
0
lnxj(i)di;
where xj(i) is the services of teaching task i available to students on island j.
The resource constraint for the skills and time of teachers on island j impliesZ 1
0
xj(i)di = hj :
The total supply of skills on island j is hj (the skill level of teachers multiplied by their unit time
endowment) and this can be allocated in any way across the di¤erent teaching tasks.
We assume that all services and teaching tasks are competitively priced, and teachers choose the
allocation of their time and skills to these tasks given market prices. Since there are no externalities,
this allocation can be alternatively computed as the solution to the maximization problem of an
island-level social planner maximizing average (or total) post-schooling human capital on the island.
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In view of the concavity of the production function (1) in xj(i), this allocation will involve
xj(i) = hj ;
giving a post-schooling human capital of
yj = e
1 
j h

j ;
or
ln yj = (1  ) ln ej +  lnhj : (2)
In what follows, we assume that there is perfect rank correlation between ej and hj , meaning
that, for any j, k, if ej > ek, then hj > hk, i.e., islands that have higher human capital students also
have higher human capital teachers.4 Then, from (2), the cross-island distribution of post-schooling
human capital is more unequal than the hypothetical case in which all islands have access to the
same quality teachers  and this is the status quo inequalitymentioned in the Introduction.
We can also determine the incomes of teachers on di¤erent islands. These are given by the
marginal contribution of teachers to student labor earnings (in a competitive equilibrium), and
thus by
wj = e
1 
j h
 1
j hj = e
1 
j h

j : (3)
For future reference, we rank the islands in descending order of teacher skills, so that island 1
has the teachers with the highest value of hj .
2.2 Post-Internet: Student Attainment
To operationalize the introduction of web-based technologies, we imagine a technological change
that enables a teaching task to be performed by a single teacher and then broadcast to the rest
of the world. Only some teaching tasks have this special non-rivalrous property, specically those
indexed from [0; ] for some  < 1: We use the term lecturingfor those tasks that can be scaled
to an arbitrary number of students at essentially zero marginal cost (e.g., creating video lectures or
writing problem sets). We refer to the remaining tasks in the set, with mass (; 1]; as hands-on
instruction(e.g., small group interactions), which need to be performed by teachers on the same
island as their students. For simplicity, we assume that each lecturing task uses exactly one unit
of teacher time.
4 In fact, all we require is that ln ej and lnhj are positively correlated across islands (e.g., normally distributed
across islands with positive covariance).
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Given this new technology, lecturing tasks are performed by teachers on island 1, and thus
students in each island j = 1; :::; N have access to
x0j(i) = h1 for all i 2 [0; ] and j = 1; :::; N;
where throughout we use variables with a prime (e.g., x0) to denote post-Internet values. In view
of this, and the resource constraint on island 1, the post-schooling human capital of students on
island 1 does not change. (In particular, the fraction  of teachers will now be working in lecturing
tasks that are being broadcast to the rest of the world while the remaining 1  fraction of teachers
work in hands-on instruction.)
On other islands, however, the post-schooling levels of human capital will change for two reasons.
First, the students have access to higher quality lectures (from superstarteachers on island 1).
Second, because the teachers in these islands can now focus on instruction, the services of these
tasks are more abundantly supplied.
It follows that the post-schooling human capital of students on island j = 2; :::; N is given by
y0j = e
1 
j h

1

hj
1  
(1 )
;
or
ln y0j =(1  ) ln ej +  lnh1
+ (1  ) lnhj
  (1  ) ln(1  ):
(4)
From this equation, we can compute the percentage increase in human capital of students on
island j = 2; :::; N as
ln
y0j
yj
=  ln
h1
hj
+ (   1) ln(1  ) > 0:
Note that both terms on the right-hand-side of this expression are positive and they jointly comprise
the technology windfallmentioned in the Introduction. The rst term captures the benets of
substitution of h1 for hj in (web-based) lecturing activities. The second term captures the e¤ect
of greater hands-on instruction, which increases because local teachers no longer need to lecture,
enabling them to reallocate their time to hands-on instruction (which rises by factor 1=(1   )).
These two e¤ects together establish our rst claim from the Introduction, that all students in
non-leader islands benet from web-based education.
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Our second claim, concerning the democratizing e¤ectof web-based education, also follows
from equation (??). Consider two islands j and k (6= 1) with hj < hk (and thus by assumption
yj < yk). We then have
ln
y0k
y0j
  ln yk
yj
=   ln hk
hj
< 0;
implying that the human capital gap between the two islands will narrow after web-based education
spreads. Moreover, this expression also implies that the larger the initial percentage di¤erence
between hj and hk, ln(hk=hj), the larger the percentage point fall in in the human capital gap
(this is true regardless of the values of ej and ek). Consequently, web-based education compresses
human capital inequality across islands.
In fact, the result is a little more stark: the post-Internet regime has no e¤ect on the educational
attainment of students in the lead island and pulls up the post-schooling human capital of students
on all other islands.5 Moreover, the model implies the possibility of local overtaking: students on
islands with endowments, ej and hj , that are close to the lead island will overtake students on
the lead island, because the students on such close trailing islands receive the combined benets of
lead-island lectures and greater hands-on instruction from local teachers (i.e., hands-on instruction
is scaled up by factor 1=(1  )). After web-based education, the educational outcome of a trailing
island exceeds the educational outcome of the lead island (ln y0j > ln y
0
1) if and only if:
(1  )
(1  ) ln
ej
e1
+ ln
hj
h1
> ln(1  ):
2.3 Post-Internet: Teacher Wages
In the post-Internet allocation, a teachers marginal product and thus wages on islands j = 2; :::; N
is given by:
w0j = (1  )e1 j h1

hj
1  
(1 )
: (5)
This expression encapsulates both the third and fourth e¤ects of web-based education on teacher
earnings discussed in the Introduction (crowd-outand complementarity).
To see the crowd-out e¤ect, note that in the post-Internet allocation, teachers on islands j =
2; :::; N will reallocate their time from instructional tasks in the complete task interval, [0; 1];
5One can imagine that because the time and e¤ort of teachers on island 1 are diverted to Internet-related activities,
students on this island might even be made worse o¤. Countering this, if teachers could increase the time they devote
to lecturing (rather than this being xed at one unit of time by assumption), this would increase their remuneration
and may attract more talented, or simply more, agents into teaching, which would tend to benet students on this
island.
6
to hands-on instruction tasks in the subinterval (; 1]. Since there are diminishing returns, this
crowding out will tend to depress their marginal products and earnings. If we were to compare (5),
with the counterfactual assumption h1 = hj , to (3), we would capture only this crowd-out e¤ect,
and we would nd that w0j < wj .
The complementarity e¤ect, on the other hand, is captured by the fact that h1 > hj  the
complementary inputs to the services of local teachers have now increased, pushing the marginal
product and earnings of local teachers.
Combining these two e¤ects, and directly comparing (5) to (3), we see that the wages of domestic
teachers on island j will increase if and only if
h1
hj

(1  )1 (1 ) > 1; (6)
which will be satised provided that island js teachers are not too close in terms of their skills to
the teachers on island 1. However, the wages of middle skill teachers (teachers on islands with
hj su¢ ciently close to h1) will fall.
Specically, we can use equation (6) to provide an explicit threshold for a marginal introduction
of web-based education (i.e.,  close to zero) to increase local teacher wages. Let us take logs on
both sides of equation (6), which implies that teacher wages on island j will increase if and only if
 ln h1hj
((1  )  1) ln (1  ) > 1:
To evaluate this ratio for small , we take the limit as  ! 0 and use LHôpitals rule, which implies
that teacher wages on island j will increase with the introduction of a small amount of web-based
education if and only if
ln
h1
hj
>
1

  1:
For any value of , this implies a threshold h such that in all islands with hj < h, the wages of
teachers will increase following the introduction of web-based education. Moreover, as  approaches
1, h approaches h1, making it more likely that teacher wages will increase in all islands.6
6 It can be veried that our model also implies that there will be no change in the wages of teachers on island 1.
This is a consequence of the fact that the post- and pre-Internet allocations on this island are identical: a fraction  of
teachers are still working on lecturing tasks and the remaining 1  fraction are working on hands-on instruction (and
thus have the same marginal product in terms of their contribution to student human capital). Several assumptions
we have made for simplicity are important for this result. For example, if the amount of time teachers on this island
devote to lecturing could increase (which would create greater demand for their skills), or if there were human capital
di¤erences among these teachers, or if agents with higher human capital could enter teaching, the earnings of island
1 teachers would also increase in the post-Internet allocation. Nevertheless, this result highlights that the increase in
inequality between the very top teachers and the rest in the post-Internet era may also be limited.
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3 Conclusion
There is much uncertainty about the ultimate impact of web-based educational innovations. Our
stylized model suggests that, in contrast to the disequalizing e¤ects of many other disruptive tech-
nologies discussed in the economics literature, web-based education will have broadly equalizing
e¤ects. Not only will human capital around the globe be enhanced, but human capital inequalities
may also decrease. This all takes place in a world where many, but not all, teachers prosper. In
this way, our model provides several testable implications that future research can address.
Our model was purposefully chosen to be highly simplied, and thus leaves out many relevant
and interesting issues. First, we have abstracted from occupational choice. Changes in teacher
wages will induce entry and exit from this occupation. This is potentially complicated by the fact
that web-based technologies will also change wages in non-teaching occupations.
Second, a major issue in the economics of education is changing costs. On the one hand, these
new web-based technologies require computers and broadband access, which are costly for students
in many regions. On the other hand, these new technologies will economize on textbooks and other
non-web resources. Our analysis also suggests that the teacher wage bill component of education
costs may increase or decrease.
Third, we have abstracted from within-country inequality of student endowments. A potential
disequalizing e¤ect of web-based education may be that the already advantaged students may have
disproportionate access to the web. The extent of this e¤ect, especially its magnitude compared to
the equalizing e¤ects we have identied, is an interesting area for empirical study.
Finally, web-based delivery of educational resources potentially lowers the cost of trying new
ideas and acquiring feedback on what works and why, serving to enhance the potential for experi-
mentation that can teach us deeper insights about the education production function. In this way,
recent educational innovations may have moved us one step closer to using schools to not only teach
students, but to also teach ourselves.
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